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Abstract
Public policies that limit assessment increases have created a system where more
valuable homes are taxed at lower rates than less valuable homes. This tax regressivity is found
not only between neighborhoods but also within neighborhoods such that lower-value homes in
wealthier areas are also taxed at higher rates. The research presented in this dissertation, just one
line of inquiry that adds to the ongoing discussion of tax equity, provides evidence that
minoritized communities will not experience the greatest benefits of assessment caps. The
legislative intent of New York State Senate Bill S7000A was to protect homeowners. What has
occurred, quite to the contrary, is a long-term effect that shields wealthier homeowners from
paying their fair share at the expense of lower-income communities of color. This is yet another
reinforcing and systemic system of bias that limits the opportunities of minoritized groups. The
research below presents existing literature on the pervasiveness of assessment bias, as well as an
analysis of variance that identifies a statistically significant difference in the effective tax rates
between wealthier communities and those that are predominantly minoritized.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Once the domain of the federal government, the shift towards local property taxation has
a long and transformative history in the United States. As the most stable form of local
government revenue (Carlson, 2004), the property tax provides a measurable, tangible, assetbased paradigm of tax liability that cannot be easily hidden or sheltered. In keeping with the
founders’ beliefs that state and local governments ought to be empowered to raise revenue
(Fisher, 1996), and as governments became more complex and specialized throughout the 19th
and 20th centuries (Goodnow, 2017), local assessment became the standard in property tax
administration.
Property assessors understand their local markets and apply mass appraisal and other
valuation techniques to equitably apportion the tax burden to property owners (International
Association of Assessing Officers, 2013). A tax based on value, ad valorem presupposes that
one’s property is an indication of wealth and the ability to pay for local government services.
Assessment is done at village, town, city, and county levels depending on the state. In New York
State there are many hundreds of assessment authorities with legal and professional guidelines
assessors must adhere to when performing their duties. The result of the assessor’s work is an
assessment roll, a comprehensive listing of all real property, its classification, value, and
exemptions granted. The assessment roll serves not as a tax levy, something that is developed by
elected officials and offices of management and budget, but rather as a way to allocate the levy
to those who own taxable real property in the assessment jurisdiction. Owners with assets of
higher value pay more, while owners with smaller and less valuable property pay less,
proportionally. However, despite the best efforts of the property tax administrator, law and
policy have greatly impacted the ability of the assessment office to apportion tax liability in a fair
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and equitable manner. Contrary to the aspirational Wilsonian perspective, whereby politics is
separate from administration (Kettl, 2015), the history of New York City’s property tax system
has been primarily driven by politics over the past 40 years.
Although the politicization of the property tax is not a new phenomenon, it has been
ubiquitous since the tax revolts of the 1970s (Fisher, 1996; Haveman & Sexton, 2008). The fear
of rapidly-escalating property taxes, coupled with movements in property tax law from other
parts of the country, New York City sought policy solutions in the late 1970s and early 1980s
that would satisfy concerns and restore what had been perceived to be an inequitable system. In
an effort to fix the old assessment system and prevent large increases, however, a new statutory
framework would serve as the foundation for an even less equitable system than the one it
replaced (Independent Budget Office, 2006; New York City Advisory Commission on Property
Tax Reform, 2020).
According to the latest U.S. Decennial Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2022), New York
City is home to 8.8 million people. Although the majority of residents are renters, approximately
32% own their own homes (NYU Furman Center et al., 2016). As will be detailed in Chapter III,
there are more than 630,000 1, 2, and 3-family homes in Tax Class 1 (New York City
Department of Finance, 2022) that pay, along with various other property types, a real property
tax on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. Property taxes are an essential source of revenue for
New York City and can be levied even during the worst of economic crises. In fact, despite the
COVID-19 pandemic’s unprecedented impact on New York City’s economy, taxable assessed
value declined just 5.21% according to the New York City Department of Finance (2022).
In terms of transparency, taxpayers in Tax Class 1 have access to information about their
values and the general methodology used by the New York City Department of Finance to
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establish them. While the Department of Finance may employ the income approach to value that
captures the investment value of real estate for income-producing properties, market value for
residential property with fewer than four units is derived by applying market comparable sales to
subject properties. In a large assessing jurisdiction such as New York City, there are many
thousands of arm’s length sales, or market transactions, that are useable for the purposes of
valuation each year. The Department of Finance publishes a file of sales on the public-facing
website and provides an interactive GIS web-based tool so owners can find their own home and
comparable sales in the surrounding neighborhood.
In addition to sales lists and other online tools, homeowners can enter their address or
unique Borough, Block, and Lot ID into the Department of Finance Notice of Property Value site
and retrieve information about the descriptive and locational characteristics of their property.
These attributes include square foot of living area, number of stories, style of home, acreage, and
number of residential units. If a homeowner alters the physical condition of a home, the
Department of Finance will provide an indication that value increased as a result of an alteration.
With all this information available online, the Department of Finance provides a level of
transparency that is consistent with the move in recent years to open data and sharing agency
information. However, despite the wealth of information about the sales market, descriptive
details for every property, and web-based GIS tools and story maps, the market value is not the
value being used to tax these 630,000 parcels. The assessed value, a figure calculated behind the
scenes using complex logic mandated by law, is the value on which New York City issues a tax
bill.
In many annual reassessment jurisdictions, the market and assessed values are the same.
The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (2022) refers to this as being at full
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value. A single number, where an assessment equals what a homeowner could sell their property
for, provides a simplicity that taxpayers can understand. Moreover, when taxpayers review their
values on the tentative assessment roll, they have a basis of comparison and can feel confident
that they are being taxed commensurate with their home’s value. In New York City, however,
assessments may be as much as 6% of market value or as low as a fraction of 1%. While the
market value published on the Notice of Property Value demonstrates that the Department of
Finance understands the sales value of a single-family home, homes of equal market value may
be assessed at vastly different rates. Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) in New York State, while on
the one hand provides a legal requirement for properties to be assessed at a uniform percent of
value, has also allowed for a rather damaging system of assessment limitations. In other words,
while assessment professionals work hard to maintain fair market values at 100% of sales price,
the legal restrictions on how much assessed value can increase from year to year creates a great
inequity within the tax assessment system.
In the research presented below there is an examination of the extent to which tax policy
has created a crisis of social and racial equity within the property tax system. However wellintentioned, policy that interferes with the fundamental tenets of ad valorem taxation has
conferred a greater financial benefit to some at the expense of others. While intended to be a
progressive system that levies a greater tax from those who own higher-valued assets, the
opposite has become true in many neighborhoods across the city as will be demonstrated in
Chapter IV. It is common in New York City for a homeowner of a $2 million brownstone in
Brooklyn to be paying half the property tax of an owner of a $600,000 raised ranch in Queens.
Although the study in this dissertation is quantitative, for the purposes of triangulation there are
parcel-specific examples in Chapter IV to illustrate the effect. Regressivity, where higher-valued
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homes pay taxes at lower effective tax rates than more modest homes, is pervasive in a system
that limits assessed values. This is explored in greater depth in Chapter II.
The research presents an analysis of variance to determine if there is a statistically
significant difference in the effective tax rates between communities that are either
predominantly whiter and wealthier, and those that are predominantly minoritized. Effective tax
rate is a reliable metric to measure equity as it operationalizes fairness. Essentially, tax liability
divided by home value to demonstrate the percent of value on which homeowners are paying.
Although scholars such as Hayashi (2021) analyze tax equity at a NYC Council or Community
District level, an advantage of this research design is the use of Neighborhood Tabulation Areas
(NTAs) as the geographic unit of measurement. Council and Community Districts are useful in
political engagement and service delivery, however, at these geographic levels there are often too
many dissimilar neighborhoods combined into a single district to make meaningful comparisons
when coding neighborhoods by predominant racial group. There are just 51 Council Districts, 59
Community Districts, and 55 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). NTAs, by contrast,
aggregate census tracts into 195 groups that offer more geographic granularity.
While critics argue that regressive taxation is more a function of socioeconomic
phenomena, movements in markets and valuation techniques, some researchers argue that
socioeconomics and race are inextricably linked. It is not the objective of this dissertation to
examine all aspects of racial and social equity, however, a study of tax equity cannot ignore that
much like other government operations, property taxation has provided an upper hand to the
wealthy at the expense of low-income and middle-class groups. Tax systems that limit
assessments without income circuit breakers or resetting the assessment upon sale, offer benefits
to a group of taxpayers for whom tax relief was never intended. This is the reason scholars
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suggest that even systems that are not explicitly bias can still harm less affluent communities and
those of color. These harms are cumulative and reinforcing (Gooden, 2015) and require
legislation to reverse. Unfortunately, when assessment limitations schemes have been in place
for decades, homeowners who benefit most are largely unwilling to see those benefits removed.
In Chapter II, a comprehensive review of the relevant literature will be presented to
provide context to the research question. The property tax has a long history and impacts health
and safety, levels of crime and poverty, education, and local service delivery. The property tax
represents, in most jurisdictions, the single largest source of revenue and is highly visible
(Fisher, 1996). While much of the scholarship mentioned below focuses on economic modeling
and the accuracy of estimating value for taxation purposes, there are other branches of research
that bring a social and racial equity argument to bear. This scholarship provides the foundation
for further research on how well-intentioned tax policy may lead to quantifiable, disparate
impacts on vulnerable groups.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Property Tax Assessments and Assessment Limitations
A research question that focuses on property tax equity must consider the growing body
of literature that examines what tax fairness is and how assessment limitations work to
undermine it (Baar, 1981; Bradley, 2017; Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2006; Fleissig,
2018; Harris, 2004; Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2021; Ihlanfeldt, 2011). This literature
review describes the nature of assessment limitations, scholarly research that defines property tax
inequity, issues of historical and current housing discrimination, and which homeowners are
paying a disproportionate amount of tax as a result of public policy. This review also sheds light
on the evolving research around racial and social equity in the administration of the local
property tax, as scholarship in this area is emergent (Brown, 2021; Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye
et al., 2006; Fleissig, 2018; Hayashi, 2021; Howard, 2020). Although the inequities in New York
City property tax assessments propagate from New York State Senate Bill S7000A in 1981
(NYU Furman Center et al., 2016; NYU Furman Center et al., 2016), the unintended
consequences of public policy continue to shift the tax burden to lower-income individuals and
minoritized communities (Brown, 2021; Fleissig, 2018; Harris, 2004; Hayashi, 2021). While
initially intended to create a more comprehensible tax system and prevent rapid property tax
increases (Haveman & Sexton, 2008; McCluskey et al., 2013; NYU Furman Center et al., 2016),
the restructuring of New York City’s assessment procedures has created even greater challenges.
Moreover, assessment limitations erode equity the longer they are in effect and are difficult to
remove once in place (Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2005). This is evidenced by the
growing number of complaints from the public and that recommendations from the NYC
Advisory Commission on Property Tax Reform have yet to be implemented.

7

As those who study tax policy understand, the real property tax in most parts of the
United States is ad valorem and based on the value of real estate (International Association of
Assessing Officers, 2013). Historically, taxing land and physical improvements was based on the
productive capacity of property that, in today’s assessment roll, is measured as appraised or
market value (Carlson, 2004; International Association of Assessing Officers, 2013; McCluskey
et al., 2013). In an ad valorem tax system, as the value of your property increases the tax burden
increases commensurate with its utility or market value. The principle behind ad valorem
property taxation, distinct from the income tax, is that those with real property assets of greater
value have the responsibility to pay more irrespective of their cash position or liquidity (Davis,
2018). Conversely, taxpayers who own less valuable real estate are obliged to pay a
comparatively smaller share of the tax burden (International Association of Assessing Officers,
2013).
Property taxes in the United States have been levied since the colonial period, serving as
a form of revenue that accompanied the poll and sales taxes (Carlson, 2004; Fisher, 1997). The
property tax was based on either the quantity or quality of land (Carlson, 2004) and provided a
stable revenue stream to fund government projects and administration. Real estate cannot be
hidden easily and, at least historically, was a corresponding parallel to an owner’s wealth
(McCluskey et al., 2013). While federal property taxation was authorized in the late 18th century
just after the American Revolution, early tax systems ultimately transitioned to state and local
authority by the 19th century, with the fundamental principles of ad valorem written into many
state constitutions (Haveman & Sexton, 2008). Those principles included valuing real property at
a uniform percent of value (Carlson, 2004).

8

In New York City, where real estate prices are inelastic and demand continues to increase
(Sieg & Yoon, 2020), assessments are updated each year to keep up with the market. This type of
annual revaluation, that establishes property appraisals on a yearly basis, ensures that market
values are maintained using the latest cost, sales, and income and expense data (International
Association of Assessing Officers, 2010). The process of revaluing parcels each year is referred
to as annual reassessment and, while many municipalities have not conducted a reassessment in
20 or 30 years (Dornfest, 2008), New York City has engaged in individual and mass appraisal
techniques to keep property records and values current (New York City Department of Finance,
2022). Annual revaluation and the practice of updating market values notwithstanding, in New
York City the tax bill is based on assessed value which, for residential property with fewer than
four units, is set at a maximum of 6% of market value. This percent of value is referred to as
either the Level of Assessment (LOA) or the assessment ratio. In New York City’s tax
classification scheme homes with fewer than 4 total units are in this capped, or assessmentlimited, tax classification.
In practical terms, for every 100,000 in market value there is a target, maximum assessed
value of 6,000. While no assessed value can exceed 6% of market value, many homes have an
assessed value far below this maximum allowable level as a result of assessment limitations.
This is a direct result of market conditions outpacing the limitation threshold. In any given year
an assessed value may not increase by more than 6% and no more than 20% over a five-year
period. This is the statutory cap, or limitation, that has been placed on Tax Class 1 homes that
was designed to prevent large annual increases in taxes. The cap is a root cause of assessment
inequity that will be described further in the literature presented below and in the quantitative
analysis provided in Chapter IV.
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While the practice of fractional assessment, where assessed values are set at a fixed
percent below that of market value, may not have a negative effect on equity if all homes are at
the percent of full value, the limitations on assessed value growth do (Baar, 1981; Connolly and
Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2006; Harris, 2004; Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2021; McCluskey
et al., 2013; Skidmore et al., 2010). The reason for this is that assessment ratios fail, over time, to
remain uniform. Assessing authorities in many jurisdictions must maintain a uniform percent of
fractional value for all properties lest they violate state and local tax laws (Haveman & Sexton,
2008). However, the standard of uniform percent is almost immediately violated under
assessment limitations (McCluskey et al., 2013) as homes in different geographic areas within an
assessing authority appreciate at different rates and will experience capping benefits unequally
(Dare et al., 2013; Hayashi, 2014).
Economics Framework
Scholarly works that address property tax equity are divided into two camps. The first
line of inquiry stems from economics and statistical modeling, where the research focus is on
vertical and horizontal equity in the valuation of real estate (Berry, 2021; Black, 1977; Cheng et
al., 1970; Clapp, 1990; Dare et al., 2013; Gloudemans, 2011; Kakwani, 1977; Quintos, 2020;
Samad & Akther, 2012). Economists examine errors in valuation, mass appraisal techniques, and
price estimation that drive dispersion and inaccuracies in assessment rolls. Common in this line
of research are issues of vertical equity, or fairness across price levels, as well as horizontal
equity that is concerned with fairness between homes of similar physical and location
characteristics (Gloudemans, 2011; Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Quintos, 2014). Many assessing
jurisdictions fail to update their property records (Berry, 2021) and do not regularly revalue real
estate to maintain appropriate market values (Dornfest, 2008). Moreover, economists attribute
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inequity within property tax assessment to the issue of regressivity, a condition where higher
market values are suppressed and lower market values are overstated (Jensen, 2009; McMillen &
Weber, 2008; Quintos, 2014).
As early as the 1970s, economists (Engle, 1975; Kakwani, 1977; Paglin & Fogarty, 1972;
Rosen, 1974; Ross, 1971) investigated the extent to which mass appraisal, hedonic regression,
and other valuation practices created a benefit for owners of high-end property at the expense of
lower-income property taxpayers. These scholars and others who have more recently published
on the topic of property taxes (Dye et al., 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2011; McMillen & Weber, 2008;
Oates & Fischel, 2016; Quintos, 2014) suggest that regressive valuations are common as
statistical models tend to focus on errors centered around the mean and are sensitive to the
number of available sales. This line of economics-based research into assessment equity is
largely concerned with developing improved techniques to model market values, reform the
assessment review process, and improve equity metrics (Berry, 2021; Gloudemans, 2011;
Jensen, 2009; Quintos, 2020). These metrics include the price-related differential, price-related
bias, and more recently the Gini coefficient that is found in socioeconomic scholarship (Quintos,
2020).
As it pertains to regressive valuation mentioned earlier, where high-end real estate assets
are undervalued relative to lower-end property, scholars have argued that outdated property
records, the lack of important neighborhood attributes (Berry, 2021; Howard, 2020), and
inadequate modeling techniques (Gloudemans, 2011; Quintos, 2020) drive the inequity in value.
While economists have acknowledged the distributional impact of valuation inaccuracies,
Howard (2020) merge economics with social and racial equity concerns as will be discussed
further in this literature review. They conclude, after conducting a nationwide study of 118
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million homes, that local governments place a disproportionately higher tax burden on racial
minorities (Howard, 2020). This important finding, supported by statistical methods, frames the
property tax as a system where minoritized homeowners face a 10-13% greater tax burden than
white homeowners (Howard, 2020). While the results of their work add to the discussion on
racial and social justice in taxation, they attribute inequities to mass appraisal oversight and the
lack of geographic variations in neighborhood data (Howard, 2020). Sub-neighborhood indices
that account for local geography are proposed as a solution to reduce the valuation bias in
assessment rolls.
The valuable insights made in economic research notwithstanding, the collective
recommendations to improve assessment roll equity are generally statistical. In assessing
authorities without assessment limitations, where changes in market value lead to commensurate
changes in assessed value, the economists are correct in focusing on modeling errors as they are
ubiquitous in mass appraisal methods (Cheng et al., 1970; Gloudemans, 2011; International
Association of Assessing Officers, 2013; Quintos, 2014). Simple regression techniques tend, by
their very nature, to drive higher values down and lower prices up towards a measure of central
tendency (Gloudemans, 2011; Quintos, 2020; Stock et al., 2002). While assessment offices
struggle to accurately estimate the value of real estate for taxation purposes (Berry, 2021;
McCluskey et al., 2013; Quintos, 2020), in municipalities with assessment limitations there are
institutional and policy issues that work to undermine equity in ways model calibration cannot
control.
Public Policy and Administration Framework
The second line of inquiry on property assessment equity stems from schools of law,
public affairs, public finance and management, housing policy, and practitioner experience. In
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contrast to the economics framework, researchers from a legal and policy perspective suggest
that legislative actions and the way in which tax systems are administered create inequities that
market valuation techniques cannot overcome (Baar, 1981; Brown, 2021; Connolly and Bell,
2014; Dye et al., 2006; Farley et al., 1996; Harris, 2004; Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi,
2021; Hill et al., 2021; Howard, 2020; Kahrl, 2016; McCluskey et al., 2013; Skidmore et al.,
2010). These researchers examine the intersection of tax policy and social equity, focusing on the
unintended consequences of assessment limitations. This line of inquiry, the public policy and
administration aspect of property tax equity, is a focus of the research that revealed in this
dissertation.
Policy researchers and assessment practitioners that examine the racial and social equity
aspects of tax policy (Hayashi, 2021; Haveman & Sexton, 2008) recognize how assessment
limitations shift the tax burden onto low-income and minoritized groups in more modest
neighborhoods. This form of tax bias is part of a larger pattern of historical, social, and racial
discrimination that is ubiquitous throughout the United States (Brown, 2021; Fang et al., 2019;
Harris, 2004; The Editorial Board, 2021; Zevallos, 2019). Haveman and Sexton (2008), for
example, argue that the policy of limiting assessed values is a driving force behind property tax
inequities in places like California, Michigan, Florida, and New York City. Moreover, it is
argued that because of regressive tax policy that many lower-income and minoritized groups are
paying a greater property tax than owners of more valuable real estate (Hayashi, 2021; Howard,
2020; Skidmore et al., 2010). The premise of this line of research is not to dismiss the need for
more sophisticated valuation techniques or to deny that poor estimation and bad data have
contributed to the inequities found in assessments, but that inequities would persist despite
emergent and innovative statistical modeling practices. What is being discussed in this research
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is that public policy, and the administration of the property tax, are designed to either promote or
undermine equity.
McCluskey et al. (2013) published A Primer on Property Tax Administration and Policy,
offering a comprehensive view into the complexities of property tax administration across the
United States. In addition to exploring various tax systems, as the United States does not have a
uniform standard across assessing authorities, the authors provide a warning about the perils of
assessment limitations. McCluskey et al. (2013) state that in order to ensure that a property
assessment system is fair and effective, assessing jurisdictions should avoid capping or freezing
assessments. Although not specifically framed in social and racial equity, a topic explored by
other scholars (Brown, 2021; Harris, 2004; Hayashi, 2021; Kahrl, 2016; Zevallos, 2019), the
authors describe how assessment limitations hurt homeowners with properties that appreciate
more slowly as compared to homeowners with properties experiencing rapid appreciation.
This type of inequity is also the focus of a Lincoln Institute of Land Policy report
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008) that addresses the foundational elements of ad valorem taxation and
how property tax assessment limits erode public confidence. As it is understood, the property tax
is highly unpopular and significantly more visible than other forms of taxation (Fisher, 1996;
Haveman & Sexton, 2008). As such, in addition to reducing the property tax base, homeowners
are increasingly aware that assessment limitations confer a greater benefit on high-value homes
at the expense of more modestly priced homes (Haveman & Sexton, 2008). This was not always
the case as the legislative intent of assessment limitations, in 1970s California for example, was
to minimize risk in areas that experience rapid inflation in home values (Haveman & Sexton,
2008). During this time homes that had appreciated 5% annually were appreciating at a rate
many times greater (Haveman & Sexton, 2008) and with significant tax increases, owners were

14

concerned about being priced out of their homes. Keeping in mind that it is the combination of
assessed value and property tax rate that generates a tax bill, California tax rates stayed the same
at a time where assessments were experiencing unprecedented increases. As a result,
homeowners often faced a 30% increase in taxes each year, resulting in a statewide revolt that
begot Proposition 13 (Haveman & Sexton, 2008). This bill, much like New York State Senate
Bill S7000A, severely limited increases on assessments and reset property assessments back to
1975-1976 levels. Proposition 13 also contained a feature, one not found in New York City’s
assessment limitation scheme, that provided for resetting property assessments upon transferring
ownership.
Although a popular policy tool to control the annual increase in property assessments
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008), Proposition 13 was the beginning of severing the connection
between home values and what homeowners pay in California. As the most restrictive
assessment limitation program in the country (Haveman & Sexton, 2008) that sets assessed value
increases at a maximum of 2% annually, irrespective of market forces, those who remain in their
homes for decades experience a benefit at the expense of newcomers who purchase their
properties and are subjected to a re-baselining of property taxes (Ihlanfeldt, 2011). In this way,
Proposition 13 presented an assessment limitation mechanism to ensure a crisis in both vertical
and horizontal equity. Homes across price strata and those that share the same physical and
locational characteristics were taxed at dramatically different rates over time (Haveman &
Sexton, 2008). This created a condition, contrary to the uniform percent standard of ad valorem
taxation mentioned earlier, that homes of greater value may be taxed at lower rates than less
valuable homes. The reason for this is that assessment limitations will reduce property taxes for
homes experiencing value increases above the limitation threshold (Haveman & Sexton, 2008)
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but in areas where price appreciation falls below the established limitation percent, or where
values are declining, those homeowners will not enjoy as a great a benefit.
Issues of vertical and horizontal equity notwithstanding, there are other implications of
enacting property assessment limitations. Erosion of the property tax base begins in the first year
that assessment limitations prevent market-driven increases in value to occur. In fact, in
California there is little to no incentive to maintain a fair and equitable market value for all
residential properties annually (Haveman & Sexton, 2008) as valuation changes are generally
limited to homes that sell. This practice of resetting values to a sale price, referred to as sales
chasing (International Association of Assessing Officers, 2013), violates the uniform percentage
requirements set forth in many state constitutions. With regards to policy and administration, the
Haveman and Sexton (2008) focus report also states that assessment limitations impede local
governments in how they spend and reduces autonomy as it applies to budgeting. As local
property tax revenues are controlled by statute, and as assessing authorities require additional
state aid, they forfeit the ability to control discretionary spending.
In a similar work published in the journal Public Finance and Management, authors
Connolly and Bell (2014) provide a comprehensive critique of assessment limitations, or caps,
and how few municipalities appropriately estimate the true costs and redistribution effects of
such programs. Their research, based in two counties in California administering the property tax
under Proposition 13, demonstrate the loss of revenue and how shifting the tax burden has
brought questions of legitimacy to the fore (Connolly and Bell, 2014). At the time of the paper’s
publication nineteen states and Washington DC had some form of assessment limitations in place
(Connolly and Bell, 2014), often embedded into state law. Connolly and Bell (2014)
acknowledge the intent of such tax policy is to provide a stable and predictable tax increase for
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homeowners, however, assessment limitations do not confer equal benefits to all homeowners. A
study in Florida found that senior and minoritized groups viewed the policy as one that benefits
wealthy homeowners at their expense (Connolly and Bell, 2014).
Whether analyzing California’s Proposition 13 or Florida’s Save Our Homes program,
Connolly and Bell (2014) agree that annual assessment limitations of 2-3% are not only
inequitable but that limitations erode the tax base. Connolly and Bell (2014) state that the impact
on budgeting is so severe that local governments have been forced to raise tax rates. What this
suggests, counterintuitively, is that homeowners receiving assessment limitations may still be
paying higher tax bills, paying more than they would have without the assessment cap (Connolly
and Bell, 2014). In practical terms, if the assessed value in the first year is 100,000 and is
increased by 2% to 102,000 the following year, tax rates may have to increase by 5% or more to
make up for the shortfall of all the capped assessed value. The budget determines how much
property tax needs to be collected and if budgets increase and assessed values remain flat, the tax
rates must increase as a result. Using an equal yield analysis, the research revealed that millions
of tax dollars are foregone each year and that large numbers of homes are being subsidized by
those properties not enjoying a benefit under the assessment limitation scheme (Connolly and
Bell, 2014).
Despite the rise in skepticism towards assessment limitations in the academic
community, Moore (2008) explains in a Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration
article that property assessment limitations have remained politically popular. Ad valorem
taxation is severely undermined by assessment caps, however politicians in many states are
reluctant to move on the issue according to his work. After 40 years of S7000A, New York City
has created a group of homeowners who profit under the law and those who do not (New York

17

City Advisory Commission on Property Tax Reform, 2020). Wealthy homeowners, occupying
multimillion-dollar Manhattan townhouses and Brooklyn brownstones, often pay far lower tax
rates than do many homeowners of modestly priced row or split-level houses in the outer
boroughs (Hayashi, 2014). One of the key strengths of Moore’s work is his discussion of vertical
equity and reliance on analyses of variance to establish dispersion. Although his focus is on the
inequity between tax rates in coastal and inland properties (Moore, 2008), his approach serves as
an appropriate methodology to uncover the social and racial inequities embedded within New
York City’s assessment capping system. Essentially, an analysis of variance that seeks to
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean effective tax rates of
neighborhoods that are predominantly white or minoritized.
Adding to the discussion on tax shifts and who pays more under assessment limitation
schemes, Dye et al. (2006) published a work in the National Tax Journal that has been cited by
some seeking to understand the impact assessment limitations have on tax equity. In their
research on Illinois’ Cook County assessment program, authors posit that even when assessment
limitation programs are revenue neutral, the result is relief for some at the expense of levying a
higher tax on others (Dye et al., 2006). Citing significant political pressure in the late 1990s and
early 2000s (Dye et al., 2006), the researchers question whether the initial policy goals have been
met at any level. In their work, Illinois was cited as a prime example of a state seeking to protect
elderly and lower income households from large increases in property tax bills. To gradually
transition increases in tax liability, however, homes that had greater levels of value appreciation
saved significantly more than those properties with the lower rates of appreciation (Dye et al.,
2006). As neighborhoods with more valuable homes often have higher median household
incomes, the policy to protect the elderly and lower-income households has been largely
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ineffective (Dye et al., 2006). While many enjoyed some tax relief, in wealthy and fastappreciating neighborhoods, benefits were greatest. In relatively poor neighborhoods the benefits
of assessment limitations were significantly smaller, and those residents paid more than their fair
share (Dye et al., 2006). This concept of tax redistribution where the wealthy profit at the
expense of low-income communities, is ubiquitous in the literature (Brown, 2021; Dye et al.,
2006; Farley et al., 1996; Harris, 2004; Hayashi, 2021). While Cook County’s assessment
limitations include an acquisition component not found in New York City, the same issues of
gentrification and disparate impact on low-income and minoritized communities are ubiquitous.
Finally, unlike previous studies the Dye et al. analysis (2006) specifically addresses public
administration concerns in that assessment limitations breed public mistrust in the tax system by
increasing the administrative complexity of a system with which taxpayers are already
uncomfortable (Dye et al., 2006). Acknowledging the erosion of uniformity, a fundamental tenet
of the ad valorem property tax system, authors conclude that tax policy that distorts the
relationship between value and tax burden will continue to create issues that require even further
government intervention to mitigate (Dye et al., 2006).
The Importance of Housing and How Discrimination has Created Social/Racial Disparities
Housing is an essential good, an important component in providing more than just
security and shelter. Housing is correlated with generational wealth and educational
opportunities (Brown, 2021; Farley et al., 1996; Green et al., 1995; Hill et al., 2021; Kim, 2019)
and has been linked to health outcomes (Alexander-Eitzman et al., 2013), as well as access to
employment (Gooden, 2015). The Federal Housing Administration and its selectivity in
providing low-interest mortgages during the years leading up to the Civil Rights Act (Alkadry &
Tower, 2014; Kahrl, 2016), is often cited as one of the primary reasons for segregation in New
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York City and the many disparate impacts created by housing policy (Gooden, 2015; Logan &
Parman, 2017). Based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS), white households
are far more likely today to own their own homes than black and Latino households (NYU
Furman Center et al., 2016), a direct result of redlining geographic areas based on race and the
stigmatization of neighborhoods for the purposes of approving or denying loan applications
(Brown, 2021; Kim, 2019). This practice was so common in the first few decades after the
FHA’s creation (Krieger et al., 2020) that appraisal manuals as late as the 1970s included race
and ethnicity as lending risk factors (Kwate et al., 2013). As a result, minoritized neighborhoods
were deemed less desirable and due to homebuyer bias (Hayashi, 2021), failed to appreciate as
quickly as predominantly white neighborhoods (Brown, 2021). According to recent data from the
Pew Research Center (Kochhar & Cilluffo, 2017), some have cited redlining as a significant
contributing factor to the wealth gap between racial groups. White households have a median
wealth of approximately $171,000 while black and Latinx households remain at $17,100 and
$20,600, respectively (Brown, 2021).
Although these trends are present across the country, for black and Latino communities
the disparity is even more pronounced in New York City (Kwate et al., 2013). Neighborhoods
with a greater density of affordable housing projects and less homeownership are predominantly
black and Latino (New York City Housing Authority, 2022). Health services, transportation, and
patterns of crime tend to follow these spatial trends that speak to why enduring segregation and
housing discrimination can be so damaging to minoritized groups and their ability to create
generational wealth (Brown, 2021; Gooden, 2015). When stratifying median household income
by New York City zip code, majority white communities are making more than twice the income
of majority Latino communities and 66% more than majority black communities (Inagami et al.,
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2006). Concurrently, controls and regulations that restrict annual rent increases have experienced
an effective decline (Elmedni, 2018) as the city has lost 400,000 dwelling units from 2008 to
2018 with an average monthly rent of less than $1,000. The Fiscal Policy Institute published
similar findings that from 2010 to 2018, affordable rental units have been on the decline,
impacting communities of color in ways not felt by predominantly white New Yorkers.
Systemic racism, historic redlining (Brown, 2021; Hill et al., 2021; Lawton, 2015), and
the disparate impact housing policies have had on minoritized communities are all elements that
contribute to how New York City is experienced by many of its residents. There are, however,
persistent issues of de facto segregation and housing discrimination that have taken on more
subtle forms found within institutions (Brown, 2021; Kahrl, 2016). New York City’s poorest
neighborhoods are as segregated today as they have ever been (Krieger et al., 2020; Stempel,
2020), relying on public housing and other subsidy programs to stem homelessness and
displacement (Halasz, 2011). To make matters worse, homeowners in these communities of
color are subsidizing wealthier neighborhoods by way of higher effective property tax rates
(Hayashi, 2021; Hill et al., 2021). Instead of sustaining a progressive tax system, whereby
wealthier homeowners are paying greater property taxes on high-value real estate, the opposite is
now true and minoritized communities are paying the price (Brown, 2021; Hill et al., 2021).
Although the analysis presented in this dissertation is not one that focuses exclusively on
the topic of gentrification, the reality of neighborhood change must be discussed when
examining tax policy and equity. As it is understood, gentrification is a phenomenon where
neighborhoods that are historically low-income and minoritized experience a rapid inflow of
racial and ethnic groups of higher socioeconomic status (NYU Furman Center et al., 2016). As
low-income residents have been priced out of their historical neighborhoods, other ethnic and
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racial groups have been purchasing homes in gentrified areas which continue to increase in
value. As assessment caps protect high-end and fast-appreciating real estate, as mentioned
earlier in this literature review, the capping policy has had a two-fold effect of discrimination in
that it encourages residents to leave their neighborhoods and denies them the opportunity to
enjoy generous tax breaks (Hayashi, 2021; Hill et al., 2021).
The use of tax policy to protect some at the expense of others is not without historical
precedent. As professor and historian Andrew W. Kahrl (2016) explains, the property tax has
been at the forefront of racial discrimination since the early 20th century. While some scholars
argue that regressive property taxes are common and perhaps a result of misguided and
unintentional policy (Dye et al., 2006; Haveman & Sexton, 2008), Kahrl’s study of
discriminatory assessment practices raises objections to 100 years of intentional housing
discrimination. In Kahrl’s essay, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory Property Assessments
and the Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, the author posits that unlike the unrestrained
racism of Jim Crow, there are contemporary forms of discrimination inflicted on minorities by
way of tax policy (Kahrl, 2016). In his work published in the Journal of Southern History, Kahrl
draws attention to policies and administrative practices that he suggests have promoted white
privilege and supremacy (Kahrl, 2016). Others such as Hill et al. (2021) agree that that racist tax
policies dating back to the 1870s, designed to protect former slavers, are still in place today and
work to erode the faith taxpayers have in the tax system overall. When certain owners are paying
taxes based on an assessment that is set at a rate lower than others, this perpetuates the inequality
between groups, contributing to persistent generational wealth gaps that speak to the issues of
racial and social equity (Brown, 2021; Farley et al., 1996; Hill et al., 2021; Kahrl, 2016).
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Several years before the tax revolts of the 1970s, a group of homeowners in Mississippi
filed a lawsuit against their local assessment jurisdiction for what they believed was a violation
of their civil rights and equal protection under the U.S. Constitution. Federal courts were
struggling with the question of disparate impact and whether the results of a policy were
sufficient evidence to indicate impermissible public action (Kahrl, 2016). The tax authority had
made a case that there was no clear intent to discriminate and as such, the assessment
administration was legal. The courts ruled in favor of the town and emboldened other
municipalities to continue practices that were either explicitly or implicitly bias. Although
Kahrl’s essay cites decades-old court cases filed in Mississippi, these legal arguments persist
today and are as relevant as ever. This is true to the extent that a similar lawsuit, filed by Tax
Equity Now in 2018, was dismissed by a New York appeals court in 2020 despite the court’s
acknowledgement that New York City is deeply segregated and has an unfair tax system.
With regards to disparate impact and racial and social equity, it is understood that
discriminatory intent is not always required to establish the disparate impact it causes. Wellmeaning legislation that distributes benefits can do so disproportionately. Susan Gooden’s 2015
Race and Social Equity: A Nervous Area of Government, speaks to the importance of equity in
housing. Much in the same way Hayashi (2014) and Brown (2021) acknowledge the unfair
burden placed on black homeowners, and Hill et al. (2021) suggest that policymaking is to blame
for tax inequity, in Gooden’s work it is understood that public policy has been helpful in
promoting and sustaining white homeownership without regard to minoritized groups. Gooden
suggests that inequities of this type are cumulative and reinforcing (Gooden, 2015). This concept
of reinforced, systemic bias extends to other housing problems for black and brown communities
such as higher eviction rates (Desmond, 2012) and tax liens (Dilakian, 2021). New York State
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Senate bill S7000A, the topic of this dissertation, can be viewed through this lens of reinforcing
benefits to a target group despite its stated, legislative intent to prevent large increases in
property taxes for all (NYC Independent Budget Office, 2006).
A recent academic work, published in the Stanford Law & Policy Review, sheds light on
the specific inequities inherent in New York City’s assessment limitation scheme and who is
most harmed by them. Author Andrew Hayashi presents an argument that assessment limitations
create disparate impacts and acknowledges the intersection of tax policy, race, and
socioeconomics. Hayashi (2014) calls attention to the disparate impact assessment policies have
on low-income and minoritized groups as assessment caps, by design, confer greater tax benefits
to owners in wealthier, white neighborhoods. It is this understanding, a result of his research,
where Hayashi addresses the primary reason assessment limitations harm low-income,
minoritized communities.
Hayashi (2014) also examines fairness and public perception. Unlike income tax
increases, an expected result when taxpayers experience an increase in wages for example,
property tax increases are difficult to explain. As income climbs, there is a perception that
fairness requires an increase in the amount of income taxes paid. However, and quite to the
contrary, as property values increase that does not always imply a commensurate increase in a
homeowner’s cash position. Referred to as phantom income, many taxpayers are concerned that
despite their home’s increase in value, in order to pay the property taxes they may be forced to
liquidate their assets or borrow money to pay the tax bill (Hayashi, 2014). The public’s
perception is that they must continue to pay taxes on an asset they already purchased, with
annual increases that may not be justified by their household income. Much in the same way
Haveman and Sexton (2008) attribute the proliferation of assessment limitation to California’s
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1978 Proposition 13, Hayashi acknowledges that the fear of rapid increases in property taxes
took hold and caused dozens of other states to enact capping laws. In contrast, however, to the
Haveman and Sexton report (2008), Hayashi offers examples of jurisdictions with lock-in
effects, where homeowners are financially compelled to not sell their homes, as well as
municipalities without lock-in such as New York City. For example, unlike Florida and
California with tax schemes that reset assessments when properties sell, Arizona, Minnesota,
New York City, and Oregon do not re-baseline assessments when properties transfer.
Assessment limitations are tied to the property, not the owner and their individual ability to pay.
While the issue of lock-in is mitigated in these municipalities, assessment limitations still
generate a discrepancy between fair market value and tax liability that is the foundation of ad
valorem taxation (Hayashi, 2014). Moreover, Hayashi states there are other costs to assessment
limitations including significant losses in tax revenue. Assessment limitations are equivalent to
calculating a full tax bill based on market value, then making a payment to the property owner
for the difference they would have otherwise paid. Effectively, the assessment limitation on a
given property is an abatement that is not justified by a homeowner’s need (Hayashi, 2014).
One of the limitations of the analysis, a study that includes sales of homes from 2004 to
2008, is that the peak of the real estate market fell just short of the study parameter. By 2008
home values had already been impacted by the recession. A study of sales from 2002 to 2006, on
the other hand, might have offered an even clearer picture of the vertical and horizontal equity
issues posited by the author. Furthermore, Hayashi (2014) relies on just fifty-five sub-borough
geographic areas and Zip codes, when tabulation areas or census blocks might have offered a
more granular look at inequity. The geographic unit of measurement aside, the analysis was
clearly defined and included assessment, income, and demographic data from the New York City
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Department of Finance, New York City’s Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS), and the Internal
Revenue Service.
The results of the analysis provide that geographic areas with greater household income,
and sub-borough areas with fewer minorities, tend to benefit the most from assessment
limitations. Hayashi (2014) also uncovered that areas of New York City where the tenure of
residency was shortest, also benefit more than areas with a greater number of long-term
residents. In describing the inequities, the research adds to the policy discussion as Hayashi
offered a recommendation to improve the assessment limitation system. By implementing a
means-tested circuit breaker, assessment limitations would be eliminated for homeowners that do
not need the benefit (Hayashi, 2014). An eliminatory circuit breaker provides protections for
older and less affluent residents of high-value property to remain in their homes while taxing
those in the same neighborhood at a higher rate if their income was greater. Hayashi does not,
however, explain how this would be done administratively or fully consider the political
feasibility of such a policy change. Moreover, the concept of innocent purchaser, one not
addressed in this research, must be part of the tax policy analysis should reform occur. The
median sale price of a home in Brooklyn, NY is just over $800,000 according to Douglas
Elliman (2021). Innocent purchasers may include families that have been able to secure a down
payment and purchase a home, accounting for property taxes that have been suppressed by
assessment limitations. Should reform represent an immediate elimination of the protections
innocent purchasers have counted on and factored into their monthly household expenses, an
increase in foreclosures and price deflation may become widespread (Haveman & Sexton, 2008).
A further discussion on transitioning the change in tax policy may be prudent.
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In a subsequent work, published in the Notre Dame Law Review, Hayashi expands on his
preliminary discussion on the inequities created by assessment limitations. His 2021 article,
Dynamic Property Taxes and Racial Gentrification, restates that in a dynamic taxation system
homes in faster appreciating markets benefit at the expense of homes in other areas (Hayashi,
2021). Unlike his 2014 work, however, this article devotes time to the underlying reasons
neighborhoods appreciate faster than others and how changing neighborhood demographics play
a role in this phenomenon. Moreover, his consideration of disparate impact and the harm caused
to minoritized homeowners is explored further.
One of the fundamental doctrines of the ad valorem tax is for assessment jurisdictions to
maintain a uniform percent of value that is consistent among neighborhoods and types of
property (International Association of Assessing Officers, 2013). As the very nature of
assessment limitations seek to prevent a uniform increase in value among homes that appreciate
at a rate greater than the assessment cap, the relationship between value and tax liability suffers.
An industry standard used to measure uniformity is the assessment ratio that takes the assessed
value and divides it by the fair market value. Hayashi contents that as assessment limitations
continue to prevent assessments from increasing commensurate with the fair market value,
assessment ratios decline for those benefiting most (Hayashi, 2021). Unlike the economic
research that addresses price estimation and valuation regression models, Hayashi focuses on the
racial and gentrification components of implementing assessment caps. Effective Tax Rates may
remain stable when the market is flat, however, as home values are changing, that is where nonuniformity becomes a challenge to tax equity. As a result of gentrification and the bias among
homeowners, dynamic property taxes create racially disparate impacts (Hayashi, 2021).
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While Haveman and Sexton (2008) and Ihlanfeldt (2011) have criticized tax limitations
schemes that contain an acquisition value component, despite its lock-in effect this provision
does have the added feature of limiting wealthy homebuyers from inheriting lower tax rates on
fast-appreciating properties (Hayashi, 2021). In New York City, however, as investors and
homebuyers begin to move into historically minoritized neighborhoods that have become
increasingly gentrified, they are able to purchase homes with a promise of limited tax increases,
despite their wealth.
Housing choice, something that wealthier and whiter home buyers exercise, is based on
the perception of neighborhood quality (Hayashi, 2021). Neighborhoods and their racial
diversity, where there are higher proportions of minoritized residents, have been perceived by
wealthier buyers as less safe and less desirable (Hayashi, 2021). However troubling, racial
preference and discrimination do play a role in housing choice and very likely, property tax
inequities. The root of racial disparity is not simply, however, that white homebuyers wish to live
among wealthier, whiter neighbors but rather that as neighborhoods gentrify, market values
begin to increase at higher rates, conferring an even greater tax benefit to the new racial group
that has populated the neighborhood (Hayashi, 2021). One of the areas Hayashi explores is the
rate of gentrification and suggests that neighborhood demographics do not change in a single
assessment roll cycle. There are scenarios where, despite the movement of white homeowners
into historically black neighborhoods, there may be a period where black homeowners are also
enjoying lower effective tax rates. Individuals who choose not to sell, those who are financially
positioned to remain in the neighborhood, also enjoy the benefits of assessment limitations that
lowers both their individual assessment ratios and tax liabilities (Hayashi, 2021). This
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phenomenon notwithstanding, as gentrification continues to displace minorities from their
historical communities, the benefit is increasing conferred on white homeowners.
Another important piece of tax policy literature that offers insights into the problem of
assessment equity and the impacts on low-income and minoritized communities, is the 2010
article published in the National Tax Journal by authors Mark Skidmore, Charles Ballard, and
Timothy Hodge. In their work, a comparative analysis is presented from the perspective of
Michigan’s assessment growth limitations. While somewhat different from New York City’s
assessment caps, in that limits are forfeit once a property sells as seen in California’s Proposition
13, the legislation that authorized the Michigan limits was also found to benefit homeowners
with higher incomes (Skidmore et al., 2010). A strength of their analysis, one in which the mean
effective tax rates are stratified by household income, is that they employ a regression model to
specify the magnitude and directional impact an independent variable of income has on the tax
rate dependent variable. Although the research cannot directly attribute assessment limitations as
the only cause of the negative coefficient on income, the research does suggest that limitations
on assessment may cause property tax regressivity (Skidmore et al., 2010).
Recommendations from the Literature
Although research has revealed the extent to which assessment limitations create
inequities and erode public confidence in the property tax system (Baar, 1981; Brown, 2021;
Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2006; Farley et al., 1996; Harris, 2004; Haveman & Sexton,
2008; Hayashi, 2021; Hill et al., 2021; Howard, 2020; Kahrl, 2016; McCluskey et al., 2013;
Skidmore et al., 2010), there are alternative policy solutions that may be more effective in
protecting homeowners and maintaining equitable assessments. Surveys continue to show that
homeowners fear sudden increases in property taxes and support legislative programs that reduce
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the likelihood of such increases (Bowman et al., 2009, Fisher, 1996; Haveman & Sexton, 2008).
These policy alternatives include capping the budget or tax levy, imposing circuit breakers and
offering credits that are reimbursed by the state, providing income-based exemptions, offering
tax deferral programs, as well as tools such as the mansion tax that shifts more of the tax burden
to those with the most valuable real estate.
Haveman and Sexton’s (2008) work includes several of the abovementioned mechanisms
to keep cash-limited homeowners from having to sell their properties. As the assessed value is
just one of three components to a tax bill, the budget and tax rates themselves may present an
opportunity to control spending and keep taxes from increasing dramatically from year to year
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008). While an assessment determines how much of the levy one pays and
not the size of the levy itself, this recommendation approaches the problem of government
spending rather directly. Assessing authorities maintain autonomy, preserve market and assessed
values by conducting annual revaluations, and work towards the equitable apportionment of the
tax burden. Limits on the budget assist not only homeowners but also other property types as
well that may have otherwise been unfairly burdened in an assessment limitation scheme
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008).
Another recommendation offered in the Haveman and Sexton report (2008) and in a 2009
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy report relates to circuit breakers that do not reduce tax
collections but rather, provide relief to those homeowners with property taxes exceeding a fixed
percent of their income. Whether by sliding scale based on brackets as income increases, or
threshold circuit breakers that are based on a percent of household income (Haveman & Sexton,
2008; Hayashi, 2014), state governments reimburse the local municipality for the rebate or credit
offered to eligible taxpayers. While the tax levy is not harmed, at least not at the local level, state
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funding is required and may present an equity issue as one part of the state may inevitably end up
subsidizing another annually (Haveman & Sexton, 2008).
Tax deferral programs have also gained traction in certain areas to assist homeowners in
limiting property tax increases, as opposed to limiting assessed value (Haveman & Sexton,
2008). By delaying payments, elderly and disabled homeowners may remain in their homes and
the local government recoups these charges upon the sale of the property. Although at the time of
the report there were 25 states with these types of deferral programs, they tend to be less popular
and have the added impact of reducing the inherited wealth that would otherwise go to surviving
spouses and their children. As homeownership has been an effective way to building
generational wealth (Brown, 2021; Farley et al., 1996; Kim, 2019), deferral programs present
challenges in both racial and social equity.
Others such as Hill et al. (2021) offer that some municipalities have adopted policies to
address property tax inequities, including mansion taxes that attempt to shift an additional
amount of tax burden onto wealthier homeowners of high-end real estate. The way most mansion
tax proposals work is that upon the sale of a mansion, defined by sale price, a 1-4% fee is added
to the closing costs (New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, 2021). In New York
City, mansion taxes are based on a sliding scale that increases as values increase. For buyers of
the most expensive real estate, purchases greater than $25 million, a nearly 4% charge is
imposed. While politically popular, scholars such as Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) argue that this
form of tax creates a distortion in the market and incentivizes sellers to offer homes just below
the mansion tax thresholds.
In the following chapter the research question is revisited, with a statistical framework,
hypothesis and data methods outlined. While the importance of this research has been explored
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in Chapters I and II, with an emphasis on fairness in tax policy, the epistemological basis to
uncover evidence of tax inequity will be further examined in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS
In this chapter an outline of the specific research methods, data collection processes, and
their limitations, are defined. Although the literature review provides ample evidence that tax
equity suffers under assessment limitation schemes, there are methodological gaps that can be
filled to advance this line of inquiry.

Research Question and Hypothesis Overview
As presented in both the introduction and literature review, the research question in this
study is one of increasing importance for New York City’s residents since the passage of New
York State Senate Bill S7000A in 1981 (New York City Advisory Commission on Property Tax
Reform, 2020). Has well-meaning legislation that limits the increases in property tax assessments
done so at the expense of lower-income and minoritized populations? Researchers have
suggested that assessment limitations harm these groups, not only in New York City but across
the country (Dare et al., 2013; Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2021).
Homes in more modest areas, neighborhoods largely occupied by lower-income and
minoritized groups, appreciate at rates far lower than whiter, wealthier neighborhoods that obtain
greater benefits under assessment limitation laws (Dare et al., 2013; Dye et al., 2006; Haveman
& Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2021). As such, this policy of assessment limitations creates a
disparate impact on lower-income communities of color, New Yorkers who pay a greater amount
of property tax relative to their homes’ values. Analysts and policymakers may be inclined to
better understand, after forty years of assessment limitations, the extent to which certain groups
receive a disproportionate tax benefit relative to others.
The research design and methodology are empirical, founded on positivism and the view
that the data will provide answers to the research question (Yang, 2015). Although racial and
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social equity are subjective, the research design described in Chapter III provides a statistical
framework that measures equity in a more objective manner. The hypothesis that pairs with the
research question stated earlier is as follows: assessment limitations confer a greater tax benefit
to wealthier, whiter communities as their homes are located in markets that appreciate quickly.
This difference in benefits can be established using statistical tests that demonstrate how
assessment limitations create a disparate impact on lower income minoritized groups who reside
in communities of more modest value growth. Homeowners in these areas of lower appreciation
pay a greater amount of tax, relative to their homes’ values, that defies measures of equity in
assessment administration set forth by real property tax law and industry standards.
The research design recognizes that it is impossible to account for all factors that may
contribute to one group paying higher effective tax rates than another. In the case of local
property taxation, data are limited and the research relies on multiple levels of government
aggregating information that can be merged and manipulated in a reliable manner. As such, a
quasi-experimental design affords a positivistic verification (Van de Ven, 2013) prior to
subsequent values-based discussions of equity and what ought to be done to restore it.
Although taxation is a multivariate concern, one that may be influenced by data quality
and naturally-occurring regressivity as a result of modeling techniques (Berry, 2021; Dye et al.,
2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2011; McMillen & Weber, 2008; Oates & Fischel, 2016; Quintos, 2014;
Quintos, 2020), it is the hypothesis of this study that when there are assessment limitations in
place no amount of statistical modeling correction can ease the inequity created over time (Baar,
1981; Brown, 2021; Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2006; Farley et al., 1996; Harris, 2004;
Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2021; Hill et al., 2021; Howard, 2020; Kahrl, 2016;
McCluskey et al., 2013; Skidmore et al., 2010).
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Data Collection and Mining a Primary Source of Parcel-Level Information
The variables necessary to conduct a tax equity analysis are located across various
datasets that must be merged and managed in order to perform the research. Datasets are
retrieved from the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS), the NYC Open Data
portal, and other government and not-for-profit websites.
According to the New York City Department of Finance there are more than 1 million
taxable parcels, or tax lots, in New York City. A tax lot is a two-dimensional polygon that
represents land with or without physical improvements. The Department of Finance is required
to value all parcels, or tax lots, for tax purposes each year as mandated by both New York State
and local laws. Many city agencies such as the Department of Finance, the Department of
Buildings, City Planning, Housing Preservation and Development, and the New York City
Housing Authority provide parcel-level data on their websites and on the New York City Open
Data portal. There are, however, limitations to their data and partial information that must be
complemented by merging in additional files.
The research design of this dissertation requires a comprehensive listing of all Tax Class
1 parcels that includes residential property of fewer than four units. In order to establish if there
is a statistically significant difference in Effective Tax Rates between residential homeowners in
wealthier, whiter areas and those residential owners in predominantly minoritized areas of lower
income, a full accounting of tax assessment data is preferable as explained in the population and
sample section of this chapter.
Market and Assessed Values, as well as Tax and Building Classification characteristics
are published by the Department of Finance. The Assessment Roll, a listing of all parcels with
associated Market and Assessed Values, is produced electronically each year as mandated by
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New York State Real Property Tax Law (RPTL). However, the data published on the assessment
roll lacks the geographic indicators for Community District, Council District, Neighborhood
Tabulation Area, and the various physical characteristics that are important in conducting an
Effective Tax Rate analysis of variance stratified by geographic area and property type.
The New York City Planning office presents a partial solution to this challenge as the
agency aggregates data from various New York City departments to make analysis and mapping
more user friendly. The Planning and Land Use file (PLUTO) merges tax lot data with tax lot
characteristics from the Department of Finance’s Digital Tax Map and contains both land use
and geographic data at the tax lot level. The dataset is available as a comma separated file or a
shapefile for creating maps. Once merged with some of the Market and Assessed Value data
from the Department of Finance Assessment Roll, there are enough data points to produce the
necessary transformations as described below.
Population and Sample: Neighborhood Tabulation Area as a Level of Analysis
Publicly available datasets offer an opportunity to analyze the full population, avoiding
issues of sampling bias and representativeness. Moreover, quasi-experimental social science
research benefits from large samples as the larger the sample, the greater the validity (Yang,
2015). The hypothesis is that New York City’s property taxes are regressive, where assessments
and taxes are greater on lower-value properties, and by sampling only a few neighborhoods in a
single borough the results may be undermined. An argument could be made that regressive taxes
are limited to those geographic areas in-sample and that those areas are not representative of all
New York City neighborhoods. As such, including the full population of all 1, 2, and 3 family
homes in New York City provides research reliability and bolsters external validity. The
frequency distribution in Table 2 provides a view into the number of 1, 2, and 3 family homes
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across the five boroughs of New York City. Counts for Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Queens, and Staten Island come from the Planning and Land Use (PLUTO) file provided by the
New York City Department of City Planning.
As shown in Table 1, New York City is home to 635,290 taxable Tax Class 1 parcels of
one to three residential units. For the purposes of this research, other miscellaneous Tax Class 1
parcels such as separately-assessable small residential parking, for example, have been removed.
Moreover, any parcel with a missing or null Market Value was likewise removed. The
population does, however, represent the near full universe of properties that are subject to
assessment limitations of 6% a year and 20% over five years. As one of the largest assessing
authorities in the United States, the amount of Tax Class 1 value in New York City is significant,
at more than $618 billion.
Table 1
FY22 Market Value by Borough
Borough
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Is
Total

N
Pct of Total Median
Mean
Sum
5,462
1%
5,165,500 6,646,562 36,303,524,000
62,313
10%
637,000
678,145
42,257,261,493
190,241
30%
1,028,000 1,225,968 233,229,410,173
269,686
42%
829,000
880,919 237,571,524,010
107,588
17%
604,000
642,552
69,130,852,130
635,290
100%
786,000
973,559 618,492,571,806

While examining the universe of all Tax Class 1 parcels provides a degree of research
validity, one of the challenges of a citywide study is that no single New York City agency
provides a comprehensive dataset with geographic areas, tagged to each parcel, at a sufficiently
granular level. Council Districts, and other sub neighborhood groupings have been used by
researchers such as Hayashi (2021) in examining disparate impacts of assessment caps on lowincome and minoritized groups in New York City. These analyses, however important in
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advancing the research on tax equity, are set at rather large geographic areas with a much more
diverse population.
Council and Community Districts, created for political engagement and service delivery
purposes, are too large to make meaningful comparisons in an analysis of variance that seeks to
code neighborhoods by predominant racial group. There are just 51 Council Districts, 59
Community Districts, and 55 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Researchers have access to
these geographic areas on a lot level which makes them popular among academics. Many of
these defined areas, however, are home to hundreds of thousands of New York City residents.
Community District 3 in Manhattan, for example, combines the East Village, Lower East Side,
and Chinatown into a single area with a population of nearly 170,000. There are rather large
racial and income differences within this geographic boundary and other layers, such as the
Neighborhood Tabulation Area, disaggregate many of these distinct neighborhoods as explained
below.
Neighborhood Tabulation Areas (NTAs) are aggregations of census tracts that are subsets
of New York City's 55 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). As stated by the New York City
Planning department, NTAs provide a valuable summary level for use with the American
Community Survey (ACS). This is critical in the research design of this dissertation as local,
city-level data must be merged with demographic information from the U.S. Census. Moreover,
NTAs offer a reasonable compromise between overly detailed data for census tracts and the
overly broad data provided at the Community District level.
According to the New York City Department of City Planning, Community Districts
provide a forum for active participation and a mechanism for communities to express their needs
and concerns. As shown in the example below, the neighborhoods of Flatbush and Midwood in
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Brooklyn have been placed together in Community District 14.While Midwood’s population is
76% White Alone while Flatbush’s population being just 22% White Alone. By separating these
two neighborhoods from each other at the NTA level, the coding of geographic areas by
predominant race becomes more meaningful.
Figure 1
Community District 14 in Brooklyn, NY

Note. New York City Zoning and Land Use (ZoLa) 2021
Independent Variable
The independent variable in the analysis, that which impacts the dependent variable, is
Predominant Racial Group. As this research design includes an analysis that identifies
statistically significant differences in Effective Tax Rates between whiter neighborhoods and
minoritized communities, Predominant Racial Group will be based on the percent White Alone,
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Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American Alone, and a combination of Black and Hispanic,
for each NTA.
In order to assign an NTA to each tax lot on the PLUTO file provided by New York City
Planning, spatial joins in ArcGIS and individual lookups are required. Once each home has been
tagged with an NTA, American Community Survey data can be merged into the master dataset
as New York City Planning publishes these data at the NTA level. Each NTA is flagged as either
predominantly Black, Hispanic, Black/Hispanic combined, White, or No Predominant Race.
ACS data provide the breakdown between the following groups and the percent, by NTA, of
each demographic category has been paired by analysts at the New York City Department of
City Planning.
Dependent Variable
Publicly available datasets do not include the dependent variables being measured in the
analysis, the first being Effective Tax Rate. In order to establish whether there is a statistically
significant difference in the mean Effective Tax Rates of multiple groups, the variable can be
calculated using the following formula:
Effective Tax Rate = (Taxable Assessed Value * Tax Rate) / Market Value
For example, if a home with a Taxable Assessed Value of 35,000 pays property taxes at
the Fiscal Year 20/21 tax rate of 21.045%, the annual tax liability is $7,366 (35,000 x .21045).
The annual tax liability is then divided by the Market Value, or likely selling price, as established
by the New York City Department of Finance. For the purposes of this example the Market
Value is 800,000. The Effective Tax Rate is therefore .92% (7,366 / 800,000).
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Limitations of Coding NTAs by Predominant Racial Group
According to New York University’s Furman Center, homeownership can vary greatly by
race (NYU Furman Center, 2018). Leveraging American Community Survey data, NYU released
a report in 2018 that stated just 27% of Black households and 17% of Hispanic households own
their own homes, respectively. This is compared to the 47% of White household that own their
own homes. Predominantly Black and Hispanic communities would represent a greater density
of these homeowners, however, neither New York City government agencies nor U.S. Census
datasets provide the race of each household at the parcel-level. As such, this limitation may
present a conflation of the results when the analysis of variance is conducted. Homes in
predominantly Hispanic communities are likely not owned exclusively by Hispanic households,
for example. In fact, it is rather likely that these one to three family homes may be owned by
White landlords.
To account for this phenomenon, a reality that social and racial equity scholars imbue
(Brown, 2021; Hill et al., 2021; Lawton, 2015), in addition to establishing racial predominance
using a simple majority of 50% or greater, a metric must be established for owner occupancy. If
an NTA is 70% Hispanic but the rate of owner occupancy is 10% for that NTA, there is no
reliable way to ensure that the property tax liability attributed to Hispanic, Black, or White
owners. As such, the Neighborhood Tabulation Area must meet two tests, the first being racial
predominance of 50% and the second being that the Neighborhood Tabulation Area is one where
the majority of homes are owner-occupied.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Considering the stated objectives of this research and advantages and limitations of
available data, a parametric one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is the most appropriate test
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to determine if there are statistically significant differences in Effective Tax Rate between
predominant-white, predominant-minoritized, and more diverse communities in New York City.
Table 2
NYC Neighborhood Tabulation Areas by Predominant Racial Group
Borough
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Is
Total

Black
3
5
14
10
0
32

Hispanic
5
26
4
6
0
41

Blck/Hsp
2
2
5
4
4
17

White
16
2
22
12
13
65

No Predom
3
3
6
26
2
40

Total
29
38
51
58
19
195

As shown in Table 2, census data provide that of the 195 Neighborhood Tabulation
Areas, there are 65 communities that are predominantly White, 32 that are predominantly Black,
41 that are predominantly Hispanic, and 17 that are Black/Hispanic predominant when
combined. 40 NTAs have heterogeneity that cannot be coded as predominantly one race or
another. The ANOVA, using this framework of predominant race at 50% or more of the NTA,
provides a mechanism to determine if there are significant differences between more than two
independent groups, with regard to one continuous dependent variable (Abu-Bader, 2016) such
as the Effective Tax Rate. The dependent variable will be explained further in this chapter.
While an independent t-test offers much of the same statistical power to uncover mean
differences between groups, it is limited as only two groups within the independent variable can
be examined (Abu-Bader, 2016). White and Other, where Other represented all non-White
communities, was initially considered. However, the median household income for Hispanic and
Black groups vary greatly from Asian communities. When Other is isolated to neighborhoods
that are combined Black and Hispanic-predominant, these census categories can be explored
independent of White and a third heterogenous Other which can serve as a control. Moreover, as
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Type I errors occur each time an independent t-test is run, performing multiple t-tests is less
efficient and encourages greater statistical error (Black, 1977). In fact, 5% error is doubled when
a second t-test is run on the same population, undermining the confidence of a test that seeks to
determine if a group belongs to the sample.
Finally, the one-way ANOVA provides additional tools, such as ad hoc tests, that are not
available in simple independent t-tests. While ANOVA offers information on means differences
between groups, the results do not state what specific groups are different (Abu-Bader, 2016). As
a result, post hoc tests such as the Bonferroni correction test, must be run. Bonferroni is an
important advantage of ANOVA as this post hoc test is essential in comparing each racial group
separately on the dependent variable (Abu-Bader, 2016). A matrix is provided that will test
means not only between White-predominant and minoritized neighborhoods, but also between
heavily minoritized areas and those with a greater amount of diversity.
Ancillary Analysis: Correlation of Market Value to Effective Tax Rate
One of the hypotheses in the research design, explored in the literature review of this
dissertation, suggests that predominantly white neighborhoods are at a higher median value and
appreciate faster than homes in more diverse areas. As such, a greater tax benefit is conferred on
homeowners in those white-predominant communities. While other scholars devote time in
explaining this phenomenon, exploring the social phenomena that contribute to systemic racism
and discrimination (Brown, 2021; Connolly and Bell, 2014; Dye et al., 2006; Fleissig, 2018;
Hayashi, 2021; Howard, 2020), the quantitative analysis in this dissertation, by contrast, seeks to
confirm whether the difference in price appreciation can be confirmed across racial lines.
Correlation statistics may be useful in demonstrating that home values and Effective Tax
Rates have a genitive relationship. The analysis presented in Chapter IV includes Chi-Square and
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients. The analysis also includes a statistical distribution of the NYC
Department of Finance Market Values and published Sale Prices to demonstrate that home
values are lower in minoritized neighborhoods.
Ancillary Analysis: Total Savings by Demographic
As explained in the dependent variables section of this chapter, to derive those variables a
calculated tax bill was created for all parcels. Property tax bill calculations are straightforward
and require multiplying the taxable assessed value (assessed value after exemptions are removed)
by the current Tax Class 1 Tax Rate of .21045. In the research design it is important, as a matter
of emphasis to policymakers, to demonstrate not only if there are differences in the dependent
variable with regards to two groups, as will be explored in an ANOVA test, but also to quantify
the amount of tax savings each group enjoys, on average, overall, and per capita.
Additionally, once taxes are calculated for each parcel the analysis will include total tax
with and without the assessment caps. This transformation may demonstrate, at an individual
property and community level, how much less regressive MVs are than AVs and how much
more certain New Yorkers are paying/saving. This can be accomplished by showing, at the NTA
level, the total taxes saved. A median tax savings will also be calculated.
Ancillary Analysis: Use Case
A use case will be presented as individual 1, 2, and 3 family homes demonstrate equity
on a parcel level, separate and distinct from the statistical tests being conducted. Equity is a
subjective term and use cases present real-world examples of how assessment limitations have
impacted individual homeowners on a micro level.
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CHAPTER IV: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
As discussed in Chapter II, assessment limitations that cap annual increases in assessed
value confer a greater benefit to homeowners in areas with fast-appreciating real estate. The truth
of this is evident when analyzing the individual effective tax rates of properties in wealthier
market areas. An effective tax rate is the relationship between a property’s tax bill as compared
to fair market value. In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis of effective tax rate will uncover
the extent to which there is regressivity in the New York City assessment roll. The uniform
standard that requires all properties of the same type to be valued at the same percent of fair
market value, has clearly been violated as will be illustrated in the tables below. Moreover, while
there is a certain amount of acceptable dispersion in any assessment roll, this analysis will
uncover the neighborhoods and racial groups that benefit most from the assessment limitations.
In order to code each of the Neighborhood Tabulation Areas, a predominant race variable
was calculated using the latest available U.S. Census data. If a racial group represented a
majority of more than 50% of the NTA, the area was coded as predominantly of that race. As this
analysis includes a research question that examines the benefits of assessment limitations to
whiter, wealthier neighborhoods as compared to neighborhoods that are predominantly
minoritized, the coding accounts for Black, Hispanic, Black/Hispanic combined, White, and
None for neighborhoods of greater heterogeneity. NTAs that are coded None have a more even
distribution of racial groups and can be viewed as a control. As shown in Table 3, of the 195
NTAs with Tax Class 1 homes, there were 40 NTAs that had too even a split of various racial
groups to be considered either predominantly White or Minoritized in the analysis. 90 of the 195
NTAs were predominantly Black and Hispanic combined, while 65 NTAs were predominantly
White.
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Table 3
Neighborhood Tabulation Areas by Predominant Racial Group
Borough
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Is
Total

Black
3
5
14
10

Hispanic
5
26
4
6

32

41

Blck/Hsp
2
2
5
4
4
17

White
16
2
22
12
13
65

None
3
3
6
26
2
40

Total
29
38
51
58
19
195

Borough Selection
Each of New York City’s five boroughs is unique, with various demographic, social, and
economic characteristics. The research question stated earlier in Chapter II examines whether or
not assessment limitations have harmed lower-income communities of color over time, creating a
statistically significant difference in effective tax rates that favor wealthier, white neighborhoods.
A citywide analysis of variance that includes outlier geographic areas that do not represent the
diversity of the city overall, threatens to obscure the study and conflate the results. As such, the
sampling described in Chapter III requires the removal of certain boroughs.
At 72.4% of the total population of Tax Class 1 homes, the boroughs of Brooklyn and
Queens have the greatest number of 1, 2, and 3-family properties as shown in Table 4. These two
boroughs are in-sample for the analysis of variance as there are statistically significant numbers
of Black, Hispanic, Black/Hispanic combined, and White-predominant neighborhoods for the
ANOVA to have reliability. Staten Island, however, represents just 17% of the parcel count and
only 5% of New York City’s population. With a homogeneity that skews heavily towards a
White demographic, Staten Island is neither a representation of the diversity of New York City,
nor the diversity required for the analysis. The Bronx was also removed from the study for
similar reasons as it represents just 9.8% of all Tax Class 1 parcels, with insufficient racial
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diversity. Just 1 of the Bronx NTAs had a majority of 50% or greater White residents. Finally,
Manhattan was also removed from the analysis as this borough represents less than 1% of all Tax
Class 1 parcels, with outlier residential market values that are several times greater at the median
than other boroughs (Table 5). Manhattan homeowners, both white and non-white, are outliers as
their median household income and median wealth are not representative of those groups
citywide.
Table 4
Tax Class 1 Parcels by NYC Borough
Borough
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Is
Total

N
5,462
62,313
190,241
269,686
107,588
635,290

Percent
0.9
9.8
29.9
42.5
16.9
100.0

Cumulative Percent
0.9
10.7
40.6
83.1
100

The total sum of Tax Class 1 Market Value citywide is $618.5M as shown in Table 5.
Brooklyn and Queens account for a combined 76% of the total Market Value for this population
due in large part to the number of observations, as well as median values of $1,028,000 and
$829,000, respectively. When disaggregated by Borough and predominant, majority racial group
as operationalized in Chapter III, in each borough White-predominant NTAs have an average
Market Value greater than that of Black and Hispanic predominant NTAs. While there is a
citywide difference between minoritized and white neighborhoods of approximately 50%, this
contrast is most pronounced in the wealthiest borough, Manhattan, where White NTAs carry an
average Market Value more than four times greater than NTAs that are minoritized-predominant.
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Table 5
FY22 Market Value by Borough
Borough
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Is
Total

N
Pct of Total Median
Mean
Sum
5,462
1%
5,165,500 6,646,562 36,303,524,000
62,313
10%
637,000
678,145
42,257,261,493
190,241
30%
1,028,000 1,225,968 233,229,410,173
269,686
42%
829,000
880,919 237,571,524,010
107,588
17%
604,000
642,552
69,130,852,130
635,290
100%
786,000
973,559 618,492,571,806

Descriptive Statistics – Brooklyn and Queens
As referenced earlier in the Data and Methods chapter, the research question of this
dissertation focuses on the disproportionate benefits assessment limitations confer to whiter,
wealthier neighborhoods. During exploratory data analysis it was determined that 184,915
parcels within Brooklyn and Queens, or approximately 40% of the parcel count, met the
selection criteria. Neighborhood Tabulation Areas had to include a racial group that represented
more than 50% of the population, and the area had to be majority owner-occupied.
Table 6
FY22 Market Value

As shown in Table 6, the median FY22 Market Value for homes in White-predominant
NTAs is 858,000, significantly greater than the median value for minoritized neighborhoods.
This tracks with the citywide data and in itself, is expected as black and brown communities
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have not been afforded the same favorable lending opportunities as white communities (Brown,
2021).
Analysis of Variance
A parametric one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), was selected as the most
appropriate test to determine if there are statistically significant differences in Effective Tax Rate
between predominant-white, predominant-minoritized, and more diverse communities in New
York City. As shown in Table 7, the mean effective tax rates in Black, Hispanic, and
Black/Hispanic combined neighborhoods are .00903, .00812, and .00888 respectively. Whitepredominant neighborhoods in the sample have a mean effective tax rate of .00865. In
neighborhoods that are highly heterogeneous, coded as None in the table below, the mean
effective tax rate for that group is .00888.
Table 7
Analysis of Variance - Effective Tax Rate by Predominant Racial Group

The tests of homogeneity, Levene statistic shown in Table 8, indicate that there are
statistically significant differences and equal variances are not assumed. With significance less
than .05, the assumption of homogeneity has been violated and equal variances are not assumed.
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Table 8

As was the case for the Levene statistic, p <.005 is significant. There is evidence that not
all mean effective tax rates are the same between groups. Details of the multiple comparisons
Bonferroni test expounds on these differences in Table 9 below.
Table 9

The Bonferroni multiple comparisons test, an advantage of one-way ANOVA, provides
that differences at the mean are significant (p<.05) between all but one combination of
neighborhoods. The comparison between Black and Hispanic combined with None appears to
not be significant at p < .05. This is not surprising as the None group is defined as neighborhoods
without a single demographic representing more than 50% of the population. In the None group
there are many neighborhoods that fail the predominance test but still have a fair representation
of Black and Hispanic residents.
Black-predominant neighborhoods, however, have a mean effective tax rate that exceeds
the other three groups according to the post hoc test. Lower and Upper bounds indicate that
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Black neighborhoods pay, on average, at a higher effective tax rate than do other groups in
different demographics. Black/Hispanic combined neighborhoods pay taxes, on average, at a
lower rate than Black neighborhoods, and higher rates than Hispanic alone and White
neighborhoods. As stated earlier there is no significant difference in mean effective tax rates
between Black/Hispanic combined and neighborhoods in group None.
Hispanic neighborhoods, interestingly, have a mean effective tax rate that fall below
those of all other groups. This may have something to do with the percent of homes that are
owner occupied. As mentioned earlier, Hispanics in New York City are primarily renters and
have a homeownership rate that is just 17% (NYU Furman Center, 2018). When identifying the
residential predominance factors using U.S. Census data, there were many more Hispanic
neighborhoods that fell out of sample as a result of the owner occupancy condition. For those
that remained in-sample, the rates of owner occupancy were far lower than Black and Whitepredominant neighborhoods.
Finally, White-predominant neighborhoods have a mean effective tax rate that falls below
Black, Black/Hispanic combined, and neighborhoods. This result confirms the hypothesis that
areas with more valuable real estate, neighborhoods that are predominantly white, have effective
tax rates that are lower on average than areas of lower-value homes.
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Table 10

Analysis of Variance - Exemptions Removed
Assessment limitations are, in many ways, akin to property tax exemptions in that they
lower taxable assessed value prior to applying a tax rate. However, unlike property tax
exemptions that seek to provide a tax benefit to a target group such as veterans, clergy members,
and senior citizens on fixed incomes, assessment limitations are reducing taxable assessed value
to groups that do not have to provide eligibility for the tax break. The legislative intent of
S7000A, as explained by a NYC Independent Budget Office (2006) report, was to stabilize
property taxes for middle class residents. The long-term impact of the assessment limitations has
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been to confer an even greater benefit on homeowners of multimillion-dollar properties that have
appreciated rapidly since the 1980s.
Although the one-way analysis of variance above was performed using an effective tax
rate inclusive of both assessment limitations and other exemptions such as school tax relief
(STAR), clergy, senior citizens, and veterans, a secondary analysis adds the exemption value
back to the taxable assessed value. Adding back the exemption assessed value eliminates
exemptions as a contributor to the statistically significant difference between the effective tax
rates between communities. As shown in the secondary ANOVA and post hoc tests, Tables 11,
12, and 13 below, the mean effective tax rates shift up but retain their differences between the
demographic groups.
As shown in Table 11, Black-predominant neighborhoods have a mean effective tax rate
of .0095 while White-predominant neighborhoods are, on average, at .0091. For every $1M in
Market Value, Black homeowners are paying, on average, $400 more a year than homeowners in
predominantly White neighborhoods.
Table 11
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The tests of homogeneity, Levene statistic shown in Table 12, indicate that there are
statistically significant differences and equal variances are not assumed. With significance less
than .05, the assumption of homogeneity has been violated and equal variances are not assumed.
Table 12

The Bonferroni multiple comparisons test, provides that differences at the mean are
significant (p<.05) between all but one combination of neighborhoods. The comparison between
Black and Hispanic combined with None appears to not be significant at p < .05. This is not
surprising as the None group is defined as neighborhoods without a single demographic
representing more than 50% of the population. In the None group there are many neighborhoods
that fail the predominance test but still have a fair representation of Black and Hispanic residents.
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Table 13

Ancillary Analysis - Correlation of Market Value to Effective Tax Rate
The table below that illustrates the relationship between Market Values and Effective Tax
Rates, presents a Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.008 that it is statistically significant (p =
0.000). The negative relationship between value and tax rate provides yet another example of the
inequities found with New York City’s assessments overall.
Table 16
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Illustrated further in a set of scatterplot diagrams below, it is not only neighborhoods with
lower market values that experience this negative relationship. While it is stated in the research
hypothesis that lower-valued neighborhoods of predominantly minoritized residents pay taxes
based on higher rates, this is also true for lower-value homes within wealthier, whiter
communities as well. Sheepshead Bay, a predominantly white neighborhood presented in the use
case above, illustrates a clear negative correlation between Market Value and Effective Tax Rate.
This type of assessment regressivity defies the ad valorem system that requires higher-valued
homes pay higher taxes at a uniform level.
Figure 4
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Figure 5

Ancillary Analysis – Total Savings by Demographic
As the one-way analysis of variance demonstrates the statistically significant differences
between groups with regard to a single dependent variable, the weighted mean Effective Tax
Rates for each racial group also support this evident difference in tax rates between racial groups.
As shown in the table below, the weighted mean Effective Tax Rate demonstrates that in
aggregate, White-predominant communities are paying taxes based on a rate lower than Black
and Black/Hispanic combined neighborhoods.
Table 14
Weighted Mean ETR by Predominant Racial Group
PredomRace
N
Black
52,489
Blck/Hisp
10,939
Hispanic
7,862
None
54,003
White
59,622
Total
184,915

FY22 Market Value
32,163,174,998
6,693,505,200
5,761,076,000
49,034,880,584
54,968,463,993
148,621,100,775

Taxes
288,947,914
59,269,017
46,687,502
435,906,001
477,264,492
1,308,074,926

WM ETR
0.008984
0.008855
0.008104
0.008890
0.008683
0.008801
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Moreover, as shown in Table 15, White-predominant communities have benefited most
from assessment limitations as demonstrated by aggregate tax dollars saved. The Taxes No Caps
column in the table reflects what aggregated tax bills would be if assessment limitations were
removed and other personal exemptions remain. Although the calculation of Taxes No Caps
comes with the caveat that exemptions for some properties may change with the removal of
limitations, the results of this type of analysis align with those from the ANOVA. Tax savings,
on average, are greatest for White-predominant neighborhoods and stands in contrast with both
the Black and Black/Hispanic combined-predominant groups. When reviewing the results,
homeowners in White-predominant neighborhoods save, on average, 66% more in taxes as a
result of assessment limitations. As mentioned earlier in Chapter II, limitations favor high-value
homes in markets that have appreciated more rapidly over the years since limitations were
imposed on New York City’s assessment system.
Table 15
Tax Scenarios by Predominant Racial Group
PredRace
N
FY22 MV
FY22 Taxes
Taxes No Caps
Black
52,489 32,163,174,998
$288,947,914
$390,075,249
Blck/Hsp 10,939
6,693,505,200
$59,269,017
$81,107,667
Hsp
7,862
5,761,076,000
$46,687,502
$70,526,835
None
54,003 49,034,880,584
$435,906,001
$597,431,212
White
59,622 54,968,463,993
$477,264,492
$668,345,635
Total
184,915 148,621,100,775 $1,308,074,926 $1,807,486,599

Tax Saved
$101,127,336
$21,838,650
$23,839,334
$161,525,211
$191,081,142
$499,411,673

Ave Saved
$1,927
$1,996
$3,032
$2,991
$3,205
$2,701

Ancillary Analysis - Use Case
Although most common in the policy literature related to qualitative analysis,
triangulating results by identifying specific examples of inequity and contextualizing the
problem is important to the research. While from a statistical standpoint the significance tests
have been met, indicating inequities between white communities and those of color, sampling
58

specific parcel-level data provides a parcel-level view of this housing inequity phenomenon
(Bazeley, 2013).
So as to avoid sampling bias, a statistical distribution of Market Values provides the
range of values in these various communities. For example, the median Market Value for Blackpredominant neighborhoods in the sample is 579,000. Once again, the sample includes selection
criteria that require neighborhoods to be greater than 50% of one demographic, with an owner
occupancy for that neighborhood of 50% or greater. In the use case analysis, a single-family
home at that median Market value is presented in the figure 2.
The Market Value of Brooklyn Block 7768 Lot 33, a 1,500 square foot single family
property, falls at the sample median of $579,000 for Black-predominant neighborhoods. In this
case the NTA is Flatlands where more than 70% of residents identify as Black. The Taxable
Assessed Value for FY22 was 27,433. The resulting tax bill after applying a tax rate of 21.045%
is $5,773. The homeowner is paying a tax bill at an effective tax rate of .00997. Street-level
imagery provided by the New York City Department of City Planning, dated 3/15/2021, shows
the use and condition of this subject parcel.
Figure 2
Street-Level Image of 1049 East 42nd Street in Brooklyn, NY
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Note: NYC Department of City Planning ZOLA
The Market Value of Brooklyn Block 7441 Lot 322, a 1,300 square foot single family property,
falls at the sample median of just under $860,000 for White-predominant neighborhoods. In this
case the NTA is Sheepshead Bay where 68% of residents identify as White. The Taxable
Assessed Value for FY22 was 30,415. The resulting tax bill after applying a tax rate of 21.045%
is $6,400. The homeowner is paying a tax bill at an effective tax rate of .00744. Street-level
imagery provided by the New York City Department of City Planning, dated 4/6/2021, shows the
use and condition of this subject parcel.
Figure 3
Street-Level Image of 2544 East 22nd Street in Brooklyn, NY

Note: NYC Department of City Planning ZOLA
In these cases, the homeowner in Sheepshead Bay is paying more in taxes than the owner
in Flatlands. However, as a percent of total Market Value, the owner in Sheepshead bay is
paying at a lower rate, just .00744 as opposed to .00997. If the homeowner was paying at that
higher rate, their taxes would be $8,574, not $6,400. While the ANOVA results indicate what the
statistically significant differences in effective tax rates are at the mean, as use cases emerge and
homeowners compare their bills relative to their values, an even greater disparity emerges.
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Take for example homes at the high-end of both Black-predominant and Whitepredominant neighborhoods. In Flatlands where greater than 70% of residents identify as Black,
homes values are $798,000 at the 90th percentile. Brooklyn Block 7667 Lot 29 is at this 90th
percentile of value with a tax bill of $7,236. The effective tax rate is .00906. By contrast, when
examining homes at the 90th percentile in White-predominant neighborhoods such as Sheepshead
Bay, values are $1,407,000. Brooklyn Block 8795 Lot 126 is at this 90th percentile of value with
a tax bill of $8,497. As was the case in the earlier examples, the tax bill is higher for the home in
Sheepshead Bay, however the effective tax rate of .00604 is far lower than the rate being paid by
the Flatlands resident at .00906.
Although each use case is just an example of trends observed by researchers,
practitioners, and homeowners, this type of unequal assessment is where the public trust in local
government taxation begins to deteriorate. The uniform standard required of most assessing
authorities is largely absent in taxing jurisdictions with assessment limitations. When assessment
ratios become random and not consistently correlated to value, policymakers may wish to
question the legitimacy of the statutory framework of the assessment system.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In ad valorem taxation, the ability to pay taxes is not an explicit value. As stated earlier in
Chapter II, a tax based on property value presupposes that one’s property is an indication of
wealth and the ability to pay for local government services. This relationship between the value
of real estate and a taxpayer’s ability to pay more has become unsustainable in many
communities. The tax revolts of the 1970s demonstrated the extent to which residents were
concerned about ever-increasing property taxes and the need for legislative action to cap or limit
these increases. However well-intentioned, the limits on assessment increases has, as shown in
Chapter IV, created a system where more valuable homes are taxed at lower rates than lowervalue homes. Moreover, this regressivity is found not only between neighborhoods but also
within neighborhoods such that lower-value homes in wealthier areas are also paying greater
effective tax rates. The literature published by tax policy scholars, researchers, and assessment
practitioners indicate that the inequities described in this paper are inevitable and unavoidable.
Once assessment limitations are implemented, the politics of property taxes prevent their
removal despite the growing body of research and focus on tax equity.
Key Findings
This research, just one line of inquiry that adds to the ongoing discussion of regressivity
in assessment, provides strong evidence that minoritized communities living in areas with homes
that appreciate more slowly will not experience the greatest benefits of assessment caps (Dare et
al., 2013; Hayashi, 2014). The legislative intent of S7000A, like many other bills of its kind, was
to protect middle class homeowners. What has occurred, quite to the contrary, is a long-term
effect that shields wealthier homeowners from paying their fair share at the expense of lowerincome communities of color. This is yet another reinforcing and systemic system of bias that
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limits the opportunities of minoritized groups. While there is no evidence in the literature that
bias was intended at the time of the law’s passing, the unintended consequences of assessment
limitations are profound. Moreover, there is a disparate impact on all homeowners of modest
properties, and from existing literature we understand that communities of color are subsidizing
wealthier neighborhoods by way of higher effective property tax rates (Hayashi, 2021; Hill et al.,
2021). The fundamental tenets of a progressive tax system, whereby homeowners with highvalue real estate pay greater property taxes, are clearly violated as the opposite is now true
(Brown, 2021; Hill et al., 2021).
Limitations
Although the analysis presented in Chapter IV expanded on earlier research that
examines tax equity at a Community District level (Hayashi, 2014; Hayashi, 2021),
Neighborhood Tabulation Areas remain broad and have limitations of their own. While perhaps
more granular than New York City Council or Community District, some NTAs have a diversity
of housing stock and demographic makeup that could conflate the findings. Additional research
at the census block level may provide a greater insight into sub-neighborhood groups not studied
in this work.
Another limitation relates to rates of homeownership and the issue of tax pass-through
that may contribute to reducing the generalizability or reliability of the findings. In Chapter III an
intentional decision was made to exclude NTAs with low rates of owner occupancy. The
methodological premise was that a study of property taxes ought to include neighborhoods where
predominant race is also accompanied by those groups owning the homes in their neighborhoods.
However, there is evidence (Hayashi, 2021) that property owners and landlords may increase
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rents in areas with higher taxes and that this pass-through effect provides that renters are paying
property taxes indirectly.
Finally, property tax schemes are not developed in a vacuum. New York City was not the
first assessing authority to adopt assessment limitations and is just one of a larger collection of
cities and counties that have also taken the same path. As such, the failures of other assessment
limitations schemes require additional attention. Although the scope of this research focuses on
New York City, the extent to which other municipalities have mitigated the worst elements of
regressive assessment limitation programs ought to be explored further. Haveman and Sexton
(2008) offers a warning that it is very difficult to reverse limitations once adopted, however,
future research should include a study that specifically projects the impact on homeowners if
assessments were to return to full value.
Recommendations
Restoring equity and the confidence taxpayers have in the tax assessment system begins
with the abolition of assessment limitations. Haveman and Sexton (2008) among other property
tax policy researchers have suggested that an increase in assessed value is not the primary driver
of property tax increases. Rather, an increase in local government spending has driven property
taxes and that the levy itself requires limitations. Instead of sustaining an assessment limitation
system that confers benefits to those who may not be in need of tax relief, jurisdictions may
choose to adopt a limit on the levy thereby reducing he likelihood that taxes become too great a
burden on all taxpayers (Haveman & Sexton, 2008).
Another recommendation to restore equity and protect vulnerable taxpayers comes from
the literature out of the International Association of Assessing Officers (2013), the New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance (2021), as well as the New York City Advisory
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Commission on Property Tax Reform (2020). Restoring equity and the relationship between
property value and taxes may require bringing Tax Class 1 homes up to full market value.
Instead of one home paying taxes at 2% of fair market value and another paying at 5% of market,
New York State legislators could pass property tax reforms that require all assessing authorities
to value and tax their homeowners at 100% of market value. In New York City, taxpayers
receive a Notice of Property Value (NOPV) with several valuation figures. Market Value,
Effective Market Value, Assessed Value, Taxable Assessed Value, and so on. The average
taxpayer, perhaps less familiar with the complexities of the property tax system, is often
confused by these numbers and have a difficult time reconciling the information presented to
them. In a system where all assessments are at a full 100% of value, there is a single Market
Value that is equivalent to the Assessed Value, and the taxable is simply that number less any
exemptions.
The re-baselining of assessments to 100% of value does have its flaws, however.
Homeowners that are currently paying their mortgage and property taxes based on a rate that
they can afford today, may find that next year after going to 100% of value, they can no longer
afford their homes. In this way, innocent purchasers who enjoy the benefits of assessment
limitations and have budgeted for a tax liability of $6,000 a year, could very well see their taxes
increase to $24,000 a year depending on the current level of assessment for their home. A tax
policy that drives homeowners from their properties creates a crisis of trust in addition to other
externalities. Those include the possibility of an increase in foreclosures, abandoned homes, a
greater number of lower-income and minoritized owners being forced from their homes.
Homelessness and crime are certainly a concern, as is urban blight and what an increase in
property taxes would potentially do to the home values of all properties citywide. The 1970s and
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1980s were difficult years for the city and few would choose to return to those days. These
concerns, all valid and explored in the literature review in Chapter II, are the reasons why
adopting assessment limitations should not be the tax relief solution of choice. Once enacted,
limitations are extremely difficult to reverse.
If assessment limitations cannot be eliminated due to these political concerns and the fear
of harming innocent purchasers and long-term lower-income residents, a circuit breaker
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008; Hayashi, 2014) option is also an available policy tool. Circuit
breakers provide tax relief to homeowners who own valuable real estate yet remain income
constrained. The current assessment system in New York City allows for wealthier homeowners
of means to enjoy a benefit that was never intended for them. Threshold circuit breakers
(Haveman & Sexton, 2008) provide a refund to homeowners when the property tax exceeds a
certain percentage of household income. Progressive taxation requires that those of greater
wealth and income pay greater taxes. Under a threshold circuit breaker system, taxpayers with
significant assets and lower income can remain in their homes as their property taxes also
consider their liquidity and ability to pay.
Much in the same way that a circuit breaker ties the property tax to income, New York
City could transform the assessment limitation scheme into a tax exemption. Circuit breakers
provide relief for fixed income and lower-income homeowners by offering a cutoff or refund if
property taxes exceed a set percent of household income. The exemption process, by contrast,
reduces the taxable assessed value of a home before the property tax bill is calculated. If the
exemption was implemented to reduce the assessed value of a home based on merit, merit being
defined as need-based relief on a sliding scale of income for example, then wealthier
homeowners would not qualify for a reduction in taxes.
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Several researchers have posited that a suppressed property tax related to limitations has
had an inflationary effect, driving home value increases above what would be considered market
norms. Property taxes are a cost of homeownership and prospective buyers are willing to pay
more for a home if the taxes are low, capped over time by assessment limitations. Recalling that
New York City does not have a “welcome stranger” component to its capping scheme like that of
California’s Proposition 13, incoming homeowners that purchase their properties today will
continue to enjoy assessment limitations. Should property tax increases normalize to 100% full
market value in a single year, buyers will be forced to seek homes at lower price points. What
impact would this have on New Yorkers carrying mortgages where home values drop suddenly?
Another likely impact a sudden shift to 100% full value would create, is the increase in
property liens. Current policy in New York City, when homeowners and businesses do not pay
their property taxes or other fees and charges, is to impose a lien on property that is sold to a
third-party. The tax lien sale has already been a controversial policy for years and most recently,
New York State Attorney General Letitia James published a memo against its disparate impact
on minoritized and low-income communities (2021). While some innocent purchasers may have
the means to pay a rapidly increasing tax bill, many lower to middle income New Yorkers may
experience the worst of this change in tax policy.
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